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In early December, President Trump convened the leaders of Rwanda and the Democratic Republic of the Congo for a peace deal. His pledge was an end to long-standing fighting in the unstable eastern DRC, describing it as an opportunity for businesses in all three nations to generate significant profit.

Not long after, however, a starkly different method for violence emerged. It was declared that U.S. forces had conducted Christmas Day airstrikes in northwestern Nigeria, hitting sites linked to the Islamic State (IS). Via a statement posted online, the President stated, “I have previously warned these Terrorists that if they did not stop the slaughtering of Christians, there would be hell to pay, and tonight, there was.”

A Defining Change of Direction

This dichotomy exemplifies the central principle of the U.S. approach to sub-Saharan Africa in this period: a moving away from championing democracy and human rights in favor of a stated focus on commerce and conflict resolution—even as this squares with the emerging air campaign in Nigeria is an open question.

“We no longer see Africa as a continent in need of handouts, but as a capable commercial partner. ‘Trade, not aid,’ a slogan commonly used for years, is now truly our policy for Africa,” declared a senior U.S. diplomat during a visit to Côte d’Ivoire in March.

A White House spokesperson stated this, commenting the President “has treated Africa not as a charity case, but as a powerhouse partner. Under his leadership, American capital, technology, and diplomacy are helping African nations achieve stability, build real energy independence, and turn their natural wealth into jobs and opportunity.”

Policy Impacts and Contradictions

This shift is major, but analysts note it is premature to judge its results. The approach is complicated by the President’s direct manner, which has included feuds with long-standing U.S. partners and insults directed at Africans.

“The core tenet is, if it’s in the long-term or short-term interest of the United States, as I see it, then I’m going to do it,” said a scholar for Africa studies at a major foreign policy council.

Major actions have included:

• Dismantlement of the primary U.S. international development agency, USAID. An analysis predicts this could lead to millions of excess fatalities globally by 2030, with a sizable share in Africa.
• Imposing visa restrictions on citizens from more than two dozen African countries and stopping most refugee admissions.
• Unleashing a global tariff campaign that has hurt African businesses dependent on U.S. markets, such as textile manufacturers in Lesotho.
• Letting a longstanding U.S.-Africa trade preference act, the African Growth and Opportunity Act (AGOA), to lapse without renewal.

Diplomatic Disinterest and Tensions

Differing from his predecessors, the President never visited sub-Saharan Africa during his first term. His best-known foray into African affairs was referring to nations on the continent with a crude epithet, which he later admitted using.

“The continent ranks dead bottom in his list of priorities, not just for him, but for the administration in general,” said the Africa program director for an international conflict resolution organization. He pointed to the recent U.S. National Security Strategy, which devoted only three paragraphs to Africa in a 29-page document.

A major feud has erupted with South Africa, reportedly shaped by claims of persecution against the white minority. This led to a U.S. boycott of the G20 summit in Johannesburg and threats to block South African delegates from the next meeting.

“The idea of a ‘white genocide’ happening in South Africa resonates strongly now in U.S. political culture and the idea that diversity is not welcome, it’s a threat,” commented a veteran South African journalist based in Washington.

Business-Like Engagement and Selective Involvement

An analogous standoff emerged with Nigeria in November, when the President threatened to cut aid and send in the military “guns-a-blazing” over the killing of Christians. This ran up against Nigeria’s complex reality as a nation evenly divided between Christians and Muslims and riven with security crises affecting both groups.

Some Nigerian analysts said that the harsh rhetoric may have pushed the government into increased efforts on security. After the Christmas airstrikes, Nigerian officials said they had approved the U.S. intervention and might collaborate on further actions.

The President has made no secret his desire for a Nobel Peace Prize. His administration has mediated in the Congo conflict and dispatched a diplomat to try to forge a peace deal in Sudan’s civil war, to date without success. While the Congo deal was reportedly broken quickly, it “helps to at least introduce a degree of diplomacy and a channel outside the battlefield,” argued one conflict expert.

A Resemblance to Rivals

Experts characterize the new U.S. approach as paralleling that of other major powers like Russia and China, who have deepened their involvement in Africa in recent decades based on economic interests.

“This is a delayed recognition of African agency, and to that extent, it represents, at least at the level of symbols, taking Africa very seriously,” said one foreign policy analyst.

In practice, the current policy likely means that “an African country that doesn’t have anything to put on the table … is not on his radar.”

“The diplomacy that we are talking about does not seek to spreading the milk of human kindness, as it were, it is about a quid-pro-quo posture towards Africa,” the observer stated.